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Abstract
We study the e¤ects of preferential trade agreements (PTA) in a model where in-
come matters for consumption patterns. We develop a three-country Ricardian trade
model in which goods are ranked according to priority and where economies di¤er
in their income level. The poorest (richest) country has a comparative advantage in
the production of lowest-ranked (highest-ranked) goods, specializing in goods with
low (high) income elasticities in demand. The medium rich country specializes in the
production of the intermediate-ranked commodities. We nd that being a nonmem-
ber of a PTA leads to a terms of trade deterioration for a poor country, and a terms
of trade improvement for the high-income country. Becoming a member of a PTA
also does not guarantee welfare gains for the low income country, unless it is so poor
that it cannot import the higher-ranked goods that the rich country produces.
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1 Introduction
In May 2004, eight new countries from central Europe (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia) have joined the European Union (EU),
along with the Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta. Bulgaria and Romania are
expected to become full members on January 1st, 2007. These countries have a signicantly
lower per capita income and are also much more specialized in agriculture than the pre-
accession EU-15 average (see Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2003). This exemplies the growing
trend of regional integration between countries which di¤er signicantly in their level of
economic development. As has been reported by World Trade Organization (WTO, 2002),
there is a growing trend towards preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between countries of
substantially di¤erent income levels.1 Another prominent example is the North American
Free Trade Agreement (Nafta), which includes the United States of America, Canada and
Mexico.
The theoretical connection between the level of per capita income and preferential trade
has not received adequate attention. In particular, the literature on PTAs has ignored the
fact that di¤erent levels of development may imply di¤erent consumption patterns, as it
focuses on comparative advantage as the main di¤erence between countries, while assuming
homothetic preferences. Though this is in keeping with common practice in international
trade theory, we argue that in a world with persistent income di¤erences between coun-
tries the impact of nonhomothetic preferences on trade patterns and welfare should not be
ignored.2 Specically, the similarity in consumption patterns implied by homothetic pref-
erences is at odds with a number of stylized facts. First, many new, sophisticated products
are developed in countries with high per capita incomes, created by entrepreneurs in re-
sponse to perceived demand. Individuals in countries with lower per capita income tend
to buy relatively unsophisticated products. Recent evidence for this is provided by Schott
1Of the 11 free trade areas that came into force between January 1, 2005 and June 15, 2006, 6 involved
a commitment between developed and developing countries (www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/
region_e/eif_e.xls). The collapse of the multilateral trade Doha Round negotiations is expected to give
further impetus to this phenomenon.
2The absence of studies relaxing the homotheticity assumption on demand can be understood in light
of the fact that the rst wave of PTAs in the 1950s almost exclusively involved countries with similar per
capita incomes and that e¤ective arrangements were restricted to Western Europe. Assuming homothetic
preferences is then a natural choice in the theoretical literature, which indeed has been the case without
exception (see Baldwin and Venables (1995), Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996a, 1996b), and Panagariya
(2000) for an overview of the literature). A complicating factor has also been that until recently the
possibility of relaxing the homotheticity assumption on demand rendered the analysis di¢ cult, if not
intractable (see for example Wilson, 1980).
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(2001).3 Second, sophisticated goods are originally developed and produced in developed
countries and only at a later point in their cycle consumed in less developed countries
(Vernon, 1966). Third, the volume of trade will be higher between countries with similar
per capita income (Burenstam Linder, 1961).
The present paper develops a model for analyzing PTAs that assigns a central role
to income di¤erences between countries. The model builds on Matsuyama (2000), where
nonhomothetic preferences are incorporated in a two country Ricardian trade model with
a continuum of goods. We extend his framework and use it to gain insight into the issue
of preferential trade arrangements between countries with di¤erent income levels. We rank
countries such that the poorest country has a comparative advantage in the production of
the lower-ranked goods, the richest country has a comparative advantage in the production
of the highest-ranked goods, and the medium rich country has a comparative advantage
in the production of intermediate-ranked goods. We assume that goods are indivisible
and order them according to priority in consumption. The lowest-indexed goods have
the highest priority in consumption, whereas the highest-indexed goods have the lowest
priority in consumption. This paves the way for nonhomothetic preferences since poor
households are not able to consume the same consumption basket as rich households. All
households consume the lower-indexed, high-priority, goods, and when real income increases
add higher-indexed, low-priority, goods to their consumption baskets, instead of buying
more of the goods they already consumed. The higher-indexed, low-priority, goods are
therefore only a¤ordable by households with su¢ ciently high income levels. This implies
that the poor (rich) country produces goods with low (high) income elasticities in demand
and the medium rich country specializes in goods with intermediate income elasticities in
demand. Assuming that goods are indivisible in consumption is a simple and tractable way
to include nonhomothetic preferences in general equilibrium analyses, see e.g. Murphy et
al. (1989), Krishna and Yavas (2005), and Bertola et al. (2006).
The signicant contribution of analyzing PTAs within our framework is that it shows
that the income level of a country plays an important role in assessing the impact of PTA
formation. This holds when a country engages in a PTA itself, but also when it is left
outside of a PTA. For a poor nonmember country, a PTA agreement typically implies a
terms of trade deterioration, while for a rich nonmember country it implies a terms of trade
improvement. Similarly, while nonmember countries by and large experience a deterioration
of welfare following a PTA agreement, this is not so for a rich nonmember country. Whereas
the nonmember country in general su¤ers from PTA membersexpenditure switching, the
rich country nds compensation in the way the real income gains of the PTA members are
3See also Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Hunter and Markusen (1987) and Hunter (1991).
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spent. These accrue to the higher-ranked goods the rich country produces. Being a PTA
member is no guarantee for welfare improvements. Only countries that are too poor to
import the whole range of world products can be assured of welfare gains when opening
up their borders preferentially. For the other countries we nd that it depends to a large
extent on how comparative advantages di¤er across the world.4 Furthermore, we show that
it is not only the income di¤erences per se that matter, but also the extent of these income
di¤erences. While being a low-income country leads to di¤erent inferences regarding the
costs and benets of PTA formation than being a medium- or high- income country, it also
holds that these results depend highly on whether or not the low-income country is partly
insulated from world trade. In fact, our analysis shows that very poor countries have most
to gain by joining a preferential trade agreement with a rich counterpart.
The reason for these novel results is the inclusion of nonhomothetic preferences, giving
rise to asymmetric demand complementarities (also called Hicks-Allen complements). As
the price of lower-indexed goods falls, due to lower tari¤s say, the resulting real income gain
induces households to expand their consumption baskets by adding higher-indexed goods
of lower priority. If, however, the price of higher-indexed goods falls, the demand for the
lower-indexed, high priority, goods remains una¤ected. Households do not respond to price
changes of higher indexed goods by increasing consumption of lower-ranked goods. The
demand complementarities are therefore asymmetric. The income e¤ect of price changes
renders higher-indexed goods complements to lower-indexed goods, but not the other way
around.5
Our paper ts in the growing literature on modelling nonhomothetic preferences, see
Bertola et al. (2006, Chapter 11) for an overview. In the realm of trade and trade policy,
noticeable contributions are Matsuyama (2000), Krishna and Yavas (2005), Mitra and
Trindade (2006) and Stibora and de Vaal (2006). None of these papers, nor any other
paper that we know of, links nonhomothetic preferences to the analysis of PTA formation.
Naturally, our paper also relates to the vast literature on PTA formation. The closest
relation is to Appleyard, Conway and Field (1989) and the twin paper Conway, Appleyard
and Field (1989), as they also consider PTA formation in a Ricardian trade model with a
continuum of goods. Their model clearly di¤ers with respect to the demand side, however.
Both of their papers construct a similar model to ours but assume preferences to be Cobb-
4Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996, Chapter 1) suggest that the formation of PTA among unequal partners
could be to the detriment of the less developed partner country. They do not provide a formal analysis for
this claim.
5The denition of complementarity used here di¤ers from the one given by Pareto and Edgeworth. In
their view complementary goods are such that benets are larger when goods are consumed together rather
than separately (see Hicks and Allen, 1934).
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Douglas over a xed range of goods. This implies that each household spends a constant
expenditure share on each good regardless of the level of income. Consequently, in their
models income di¤erences  within and across countries  do not matter for the aggregate
variables. By including nonhomothetic preferences, we take these issues into account,
making it possible to analyze PTAs between countries that di¤er in their stage of economic
development.
We proceed with the paper as follows. In Section 2, we extend Matsuyamas (2000)
framework to allow for an analysis of the consequences of PTAs. In particular, we will
include a third country, while we also incorporate import tari¤s on initial trade ows.
We specify initial trade equilibrium and discuss how the endogenous variables depend
on the income distribution. In Section 3 we discuss two equilibrium congurations that
may result. Depending on the level of income of the poor country, the equilibrium trade
pattern can be either symmetric or asymmetric. This section provides also a more detailed
comparison to the standard literature. In Section 4, we examine and explain how the
inclusion of nonhomothetic preferences a¤ects the general equilibrium e¤ects of (unilateral)
tari¤ reductions. In Section 5 and 6 we analyze the e¤ects of various formations of PTAs.
Section 5 discusses the e¤ects of PTAs on specialization and the terms of trade of member
and nonmember countries, while Section 6 discusses the concomitant welfare e¤ects. Section
7 elaborates on which type of integration is more welfare enhancing for individual countries.
It determines the welfare e¤ects of unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization and
compares these with the welfare e¤ects of PTA formation. Section 8, nally, concludes.
2 The Model
We consider three countries, countries 1, 2, and 3. In each country there exists a continuum
of competitive industries, indexed by z 2 [0;1); each producing a homogeneous good also
indexed by z; using labor only. For good z, let aj(z) be the unit labor requirement in
country j (j = 1; 2; 3). We follow Appleyard, Conway and Field (1989) (hereafter: ACF)
and make the following assumptions on technology:
Assumption 1
ai(z)
a1(z)
 Ai(z) with   z
Ai
@Ai
@z
  i > 0 for i = 2; 3 and all z:
Assumption 2 2 < 3 for all z.
Assumption 1 is standard and requires that Ai (i = 2; 3) is smooth, continuous, and
strictly decreasing in z 2 [0;1): It ensures that commodities can be ranked in order of
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diminishing comparative advantage of country 1 relative to both country 2 and 3. Assump-
tion 2 implies that A3(z) is relatively steeper than A2(z) so that A3(z)=A2(z) is strictly
decreasing in z. Assumption 2 ensures that country 3 has an increasing comparative ad-
vantage relative to country 2 for higher z.
We start from a situation in which trade ows are distorted by tari¤s. Let  jk be one
plus the ad valorem tari¤ in country j on any of the commodities z when it is produced
in country k (i.e.  jk = 1 + tjk; tjk > 0 for j 6= k and for all z). Then, under perfect
competition, given wages and tari¤s, a country exports good z when it can produce that
good at the lowest cost. Let the relative wages be !i = w1=wi for i = 2; 3. It follows that
there will be six equilibrium borderline goods zk for k = 1; ::; 6 which demarcate for each
country the range of own production, range of exports, and the range of non-traded goods.
For given wages and tari¤s, these borderline goods are represented by equalities in (1)-(6)
(see ACF (1989), p.151).
 country 1 will export to country 2 if and only if  21w1a1 5 w2a2 and  21w1a1 5
 23w3a3 with borderline good z1 determined by
 21!2 = a2(z1)=a1(z1); (1)
 country 1 will export to country 3 i¤  31w1a1 5  32w2a2 and  31w1a1 5 w3a3 with
borderline good z2 determined by
 31!2 =  32a2(z2)=a1(z2); (2)
 country 2 will export to country 1 i¤  12w2a2 5 w1a1 and  12w2a2 5  13w3a3 with
borderline good z3 determined by
!2 =  12a2(z3)=a1(z3); (3)
 country 2 will export to country 3 i¤  32w2a2 5 w3a3 and  32w2a2 5  31w1a1 with
borderline good z4 determined by
!2=!3 =  32a2(z4)=a3(z4); (4)
 country 3 will export to country 1 i¤  13w3a3 5  12w2a2 and  13w3a3 5 w1a1 with
borderline good z5 determined by
!3=!2 = a3(z5) 13=a2(z5) 12; (5)
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 country 3 will export to country 2 i¤  23w3a3 5 w2a2 and  23w3a3 5  21w1a1 with
borderline good z6 determined by
!3=!2 =  23a3(z6)=a2(z6): (6)
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the trade patterns in terms of the borderline
goods. Country 1 produces all z 2 [0; z3); of which [z2; z3] are not traded and [0; z1] and
[0; z2] are exported respectively to country 2 and 3. Country 2 produces all z 2 [z1; z6), of
which [z1; z2] and [z5; z6] are not traded and [z3; z5] and [z2; z4] are respectively exported to
country 1 and 3. Country 3, nally, produces all z 2 [z4; u3], of which [z4; z5] are not traded,
while [z5; u1] and [z6; u2] are respectively exported to country 1 and 2. Here uj denotes the
highest-indexed good z a household from country j, j = 1; 2; 3; consumes. The resulting
trade pattern satises z1 < z2 < z3 < z4 < z5 < z6 as long as (i) directly exporting good
z costs less than exporting the same good via a third country and (ii) tari¤ rates do not
di¤er too much between countries. For example, given assumptions 1 and 2 and conditions
(5) and (6), z5 < z6 holds unless  13 >  12 23 that is, if the direct tari¤ country 1 pays on
imports from country 3 is larger than the tari¤s country 1 pays on imports from country
3 when good z is imported via country 2. The exception is z3 < z4 where z4 < z3 is also
possible. We exclude this possibility and assume z3 < z4 for the rest of the analysis.6 As
we will argue later, the trade patterns depicted only hold when households in all three
countries are rich enough to consume the higher-indexed goods country 3 produces, in
contrast to ACF.
(insert Figure 1 about here)
As country 1 exports all goods of the lower spectrum of commodities, country 3 the higher-
ranked commodities, and country 2 the middle-ranked goods, local prices are determined
by
pk(z) = min
j
[ kjwjaj(z)]:
Even if traded, the local price of good z does not need to be identical.
On the demand side, we assume there are Nj households in country j. In line with
Matsuyama (2000) and Stibora and de Vaal (2006), we assume that the income distribution
is nondegenerate and brought about by tari¤ rebates and by di¤erences in skills reected in
di¤erences in e¤ective labor supply. We let Fj(hj) denote the distribution of e¤ective (skill
6If z4 < z3 this would create an additional range of nontraded goods for country 2, but would otherwise
not change any of the main results.
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based) labor supply across households in country j. The total labor supply thus equals
Lj = Nj
R1
0
hjdFj(hj) in each country.
The consumption set of a household includes a continuum of z 2 [0;1). All house-
holds have the same preferences and maximize V =
R1
0
b(z)x(z)dz subject to the budget
constraint
R1
0
p(z)x(z)dz  I. In these expressions, x(z) = f0; 1g denotes the quantity
a household consumes and b(z) > 0 the utility it receives from consuming good z. Thus,
following Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), goods come in discrete units and a house-
holds desire to consume good z is satiated after the consumption of one unit. This has the
strong implication that, in contrast to standard analysis, an increase in utility is reected
in the consumption of an increased number of goods rather than in the consumption of
higher quantities of a xed number of goods. As such, wealthier households consume all
the goods consumed by poor households, plus some. Moreover, the linearity of the utility
function in b implies the absence of any substitution e¤ects and that only income e¤ects
are important for our results.
The order in which each household purchases goods is assumed to be the same as
the ordering of goods due to comparative advantage. Hence, we assume that households
consider lower-indexed goods to be of higher priority. These are purchased rst and when
income increases households add goods with lower priority to their consumption baskets.
This requires that the order of utility per unit price is strictly decreasing in z, which is
made explicit by assumption 3.
Assumption 3
b(z)
pk(z)
=
b(z)
minj[ kjwjaj(z)]
is strictly decreasing in z, for given wj and  kj:
Assumption 3 implies that the marginal utility of income is decreasing in z.
The combination of assumptions 1, 2, and 3 implies that (i) country 1 has a comparative
advantage in the production of lower-ranked goods that poor households purchase: (ii)
country 3 has a comparative advantage in the production of higher-ranked goods that rich
households purchase; (iii) country 2 has a comparative advantage in the production of
intermediate-ranked goods that are purchased by households richer than those purchasing
goods from country 1 but poorer than those purchasing goods from country 3.
We now dene
Ej(z) 
Z z
0
pj(s)ds =
Z z
0
minf jkwkak(z)gds (7)
as the minimum level of income that allows a household from country j to consume good z.
As the range of goods consumed will typically include imported goods, tari¤ revenues also
a¤ect the income distribution. We assume that the tari¤ revenue each household generates
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by purchasing imported goods, if any, is collected by the government and redistributed
across households in a lump-sum fashion. Let us denote these tari¤ rebates in country j
by TRj and let us also assume that households take those rebates from the government as
given. The highest-indexed commodity a household in country j with income wjhj + TRj
is able to consume, uj(hj), is determined by the requirement that
Ej[uj(hj)] = wjhj + TRj (8)
for j = 1; 2; 3: The utility level a household in country j attains when consuming uj(hj)
is Vj(hj) = B(uj(hj)) where B(z) 
R z
0
b(s)ds: Vj(hj) maps one-to-one into uj(hj); the
highest-indexed good it consumes. We therefore use the latter as a measure of utility (see
Matsuyama (2000)).
Good z is purchased by households only if their income is not lower than Ej(z), or,
equivalently, if their skill is such that wjhj+TRj exceeds Ej(z). The fraction of households
with income (skills) in excess of Ej(z); thus with wjhj > Ej(z)   TRj; is given by 1  
Fj([E(z)  TRj]=wj): Aggregate demand for good z is the number of households from the
three countries whose income is equal or greater than Ej(z), with demand from country j
given by
Qj(z) = Nj

1  Fj

E(z)  TRj
wj

for j = 1; 2; 3: (9)
In contrast to the standard literature, equation (9) indicates that total demand for good
z does not depend on aggregate income but on the number of households that have a
su¢ cient level of income (skill) to consume it.
In the presence of tari¤s, country 1 produces only goods in [0; z3), of which [0; z1] are
exported to country 2 and of which [0; z2] are exported to country 3. Consequently, labor
market equilibrium in country 1 has to satisfy:
L1 = N1
R1
0
h1dF1(h1)
=
R z3
0
a1(z)Q1(z)dz +
R z2
0
a1(z)Q3(z)dz +
R z1
0
a1(z)Q2(z)dz:
(10)
The left hand side of (10) represents country 1s e¤ective labor supply. The right hand side
is the derived demand for country 1 labor. Combining (10) and (9), and using (7), country
1s labor market equilibrium can be expressed as (see Appendix A.1 for details)
w1L1 = N1
1R
0
min [w1h1 + TR1; E1(z3)] dF1(h1)
+
N2
 21
1R
0
min [w2h2 + TR2; E2(z1)] dF2(h2)
+
N3
 31
1R
0
min [w3h3 + TR3; E3(z2)] dF3(h3);
(11)
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with E2(z1) =  21
R z1
0
w1a1(s)ds; E3(z2) =  31
R z2
0
w1a1(s)ds; and E1(z3) =
R z3
0
w1a1(s)ds.
Equation (11) denes national income for country 1, which has to be equal to the total
spending on goods produced in that country (including tari¤s). Total spending, in turn, is
the sum of country 1s expenditure on its own goods, and the other countriesexpenditure
on country 1 goods. We note that country 1s tari¤ rebate as a result of imports, TR1;
is only positive if the income of (some of the) households in country 1 exceeds E1(z3),
otherwise tari¤ revenues are zero. To raise tari¤ revenues, country 1 should therefore at
least be rich enough to import goods from country 2. By contrast, the tari¤ rebates for
country 2 and country 3 (TR2 and TR3) are always positive, since households from those
countries always import the lower-indexed goods that are produced in country 1.
Similar reasoning applies to the labor market equilibrium conditions for country 2 and 3,
which we derive in Appendix A.2. In line with standard practice in trade theory literature,
we replace the three labor market equilibrium conditions by the equivalent statement that
in equilibrium trade has to be balanced. For the trade balance condition of country 1, we
obtain
N2
 21
1R
0
min[w2h2 + TR2; E2(z1)]dF2(h2) +
N3
 31
1R
0
min[w3h3 + TR3; E3(z2)]dF3(h3)
=
1R
0

N1
 12
min [w1h1 + TR1   E1(z3); E1(z5)  E1(z3)]
+
N1
 13
max [w1h1 + TR1   E1(z5); 0]

dF1(h1)
(12)
and for country 2:
1R
0

N2
 21
min [w2h2 + TR2; E2(z1)] +
N2
 23
max [w2h2 + TR2   E2(z6); 0]

dF2(h2)
=
N1
 12
1R
0
min [w1h1 + TR1   E1(z3); E1(z5)  E1(z3)] dF1(h1)
+
N3
 32
1R
0
min [w3h3 + TR3   E3(z2); E3(z4)  E3(z2)] dF3(h3);
(13)
where E1(z5)   E1(z3) =  12
R z5
z3
w2a2(s)ds and E3(z4)   E3(z2) =  32
R z4
z2
w2a2(s)ds: Note
that both (12) and (13) give a representation of the demand side only. The rst row in
(12) [(13)] represents the value of country 1s [2s] exports, which, in equilibrium, has to
equal its value of imports due to the static nature of the model.
The six equations that determine e¢ cient production, (1)-(6), together with the bal-
anced trade conditions (12)-(13) and the three budget conditions, given by (8), dene a
system of 11 equations which jointly determine the equilibrium values of the marginal
goods z1   z6, the relative wage rates !i ( w1=wi) for i = 2; 3, and the utility levels uj
for j = 1; 2; 3. As is apparent from (12) and (13), the skill distribution of hj and the
9
distribution of TRj a¤ect the endogenous variables. This is a direct result of incorporating
nonhomothetic preferences. While the income of some households (in some countries) will
be su¢ cient to buy the highest-indexed good, for other households income may only su¢ ce
to buy lower-indexed goods. This a¤ects the precise form of the trade balance conditions
as we show in the next section.
To facilitate us to focus on the relation between PTA formation and global income
disparities we make two further assumptions:7
Assumption 4 hj = 1, j = 1; 2; 3.
Assumption 5 a2(z)=a1(z) < 1 and a3(z)=a2(z) < 1 for all z 2 [0;1):
Assumption 4 states that households in country j have identical skill levels. As such, as-
sumption 4 eliminates income di¤erences within countries but not necessarily across coun-
tries. This requires Assumption 5, which ensures that !2 < 1 < !2=!3. When combined
with assumptions 1-3, it follows that country 1 (3) is the low-income (high-income) country,
which specializes in lower-indexed (higher-indexed) goods with low (high) income elastic-
ities in demand; and country 2 is the middle-income country, which specializes in the
intermediate range of goods with intermediate income elasticities in demand.8
3 Symmetric and Asymmetric Trade Equilibrium
Given assumptions 1-3, the model always generates a unique equilibrium, but two equilib-
rium congurations turn out to be of special interest. The rst equilibrium outcome holds
when all households spend their last unit of income on goods produced in country 3. The
resulting trade pattern is characterized by two-way bilateral trade ows between any pair
of countries. We refer to this equilibrium conguration as the symmetric trade equilibrium.
The conditions for balanced trade become, in place of (12) and (13) (see Appendix B):
N1(1 
Z z3
0
a1(s)ds) = N2
Z z1
0
a1(s)ds+N3
Z z2
0
a1(s)ds (14)
7Similar assumptions have been made by Flam and Helpman (1987) and Stokey (1991) in the context
of simple North-South trade models with nonhomothetic preferences. Additionally, those authors assume
that goods are ranked according to product quality and that goods are gross substitutes. However, they
do not analyze the formation of PTAs.
8Violation of assumption 5 could imply that country 3 households become so poor that they are only
able to consume goods from countries 1 and 2. All the high-indexed goods country 3 produces are then
exported to the two richer countries. For obvious reasons, we do not pursue this parameter constellation.
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and
N2(1 
Z z6
z1
a2(s)ds) = N1
Z z5
z3
a2(s)ds+N3
Z z4
z2
a2(s)ds; (15)
where the left-hand-side in (14) [(15)] denotes the value of country 1s [country 2s] imports
and the right-hand-side the corresponding value of exports. The highest-indexed good uj
that is associated with the symmetric trade equilibrium is derived from (8) and is given byZ z3
0
a1(s)ds+
Z z5
z3
a2(s)
!2
ds+
Z u1
z5
a3(s)
!3
ds = 1 (16)
Z z1
0
a1(s)ds+
Z z6
z1
a2(s)
!2
ds+
Z u2
z6
a3(s)
!3
ds =
1
!2
(17)Z z2
0
a1(s)ds+
Z z4
z2
a2(s)
!2
ds+
Z u3
z4
a3(s)
!3
ds =
1
!3
: (18)
The absence of any tari¤terms in these budget constraints is due to the fact that households
actually pay a tari¤ exclusive price as a result of the proportional tari¤ rebates. The
symmetric trade equilibrium corresponds to the one illustrated in Figure 1.
The second equilibrium conguration we consider is when households from country 1
are not rich enough to consume goods produced in country 3. In this case households in
country 1 spend their last unit of income on goods produced in country 2, while households
in country 2 and 3 still spend their marginal income on goods produced in country 3, that is,
w1+TR1 E1(z3) < E1(z5) E1(z3): This equilibrium conguration also involves one-way
bilateral trade ows and we will refer to this outcome as the asymmetric trade equilibrium.9
Country 1 does not import from country 3 and runs a trade surplus with country 3, implying
that country 2 has a bilateral trade surplus with country 1, and country 3 has a bilateral
trade surplus with country 2. The conditions for balanced trade become:
N1(1 
Z z3
0
a1(s)ds) = N2
Z z1
0
a1(s)ds+N3
Z z2
0
a1(s)ds (19)
and
N2(1 
Z z6
z1
a2(s)ds) = !2N1(1 
Z z3
0
a1(s)ds) +N3
Z z4
z2
a2(s)ds: (20)
As before, the left hand side of (19) [(20)] represents country 1s [country 2s] value of
imports which equals their respective value of exports, the right hand side. The noteworthy
di¤erence with the symmetric trade equilibrium is the inclusion of !2 in (20), to which we
9As such, our framework also provides an alternative, demand-side explanation for the asymmetries in
bilateral trade ows Helpman et al. (2005) have recently drawn attention to. They claim that for about
10% of all country pairs trade is one-way only. Taking into account that nearly half of all country pairs do
not trade with each other, this implies that roughly 20% of all bilateral trade ows is one-way.
11
will come back below. Since u1 < z5; the budget constraint of country 1 household, (16),
changes into Z z3
0
a1(s)ds+
Z u1
z3
a2(s)
!2
ds = 1; (21)
while the budget constraints for country 2 and 3 remain (17) and (18), respectively. Con-
sequently, the asymmetric equilibrium satises z1 < ::: < u1 < z5 < z6 < u2 < u3, making
z5 redundant in the analysis (and in Figure 1).
Many features of these two equilibrium congurations deserve emphasis. Let us concen-
trate on the most important ones. First, the assumed preferences in our set-up imply that
goods are not gross substitutes, which is a fundamental di¤erence with the standard litera-
ture on the formation of PTAs. If the price of lower-indexed goods declines, consumers do
not substitute toward relatively cheaper goods but instead expand the consumption basket
always toward higher-indexed goods, as a result of the higher purchasing power. On the
other hand, if the price of higher-indexed good falls, consumers do not switch expenditures
towards lower-ranked goods.
Second, direct income e¤ects only a¤ect the balanced trade conditions of the asym-
metric trade equilibrium conguration and not those of the symmetric trade equilibrium
conguration. To see this, consider the e¤ects of an increase in the factor reward in country
2, ceteris paribus.10 In the symmetric trade equilibrium, this raises the real income of coun-
try 2 households with respect to imported goods, which is completely spent on goods from
country 3. Likewise, it diminishes the real income of country 1 and country 3 households
they face higher import prices for country 2 goodswhich reduces spending on country
3 goods. With initially balanced trade, these spending e¤ects exactly cancel out, leaving a
net change in spending on goods from country 3 of zero. As a similar reasoning holds for
changes in the factor rewards of the other countries, it follows that in the symmetric trade
equilibrium direct real income e¤ects do not a¤ect the trade balance conditions, explaining
the absence of !i; i = 2; 3 in the trade balance condition. This is di¤erent for the asymmet-
ric trade equilibrium conguration. Households in country 1 are then too poor to buy the
higher-indexed goods from country 3 and the decline in their real incomes a¤ects spending
on country 2 goods instead. Since this is unmatched by any of the other spending e¤ects 
the real income e¤ects of country 2 and country 3 households still apply to country 3 goods
 the net e¤ect on spending on country 2 goods is negative and !2 enters the balanced
trade condition of country 2.11
10Direct income e¤ects due to tari¤ changes are absent since tari¤ rebates imply that consumers pay a
tari¤-exclusive price.
11Applying analogue reasoning to changes in the factor rewards of the other countries explains why !2
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Third, the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric trade patterns arises endoge-
nously in our model. The distinction itself is of course not new as several authors have used
it to facilitate their analysis, see, for instance, Meade (1955), Mundell (1964), ACF, and
Berglas (1979). The notable di¤erence, however, is that in our framework the (a)symmetry
in trade patterns is a general equilibrium outcome, rather than a structure that is being
imposed. This novel aspect allows us to analyze the consequences of trade policy on trade
and welfare in a multiregional setting in the presence of signicant income e¤ects in a
tractable manner.
4 Unilateral Tari¤Policy among Heterogeneous Coun-
tries
To examine and explain how the inclusion of nonhomothetic preferences matters for the
general equilibrium e¤ects of tari¤reductions, we rst examine the e¤ects of unilateral tari¤
reductions in a three country setting. For the purpose at hand we assume that assumptions
4 and 5 hold. To simplify calculations, we additionally assume that a country initially levies
uniform tari¤ rates on all imports regardless of the source, i.e.,  jk =  jk0 for j; k; k0 = 1; 2; 3
and k 6= k0. This is in keeping with the most favoured nation(MFN) clause of the GATT
Articles of Agreement. We contrast our results with those of ACF, as their analysis is the
closest parallel to our work.12 They, however, assume that all households have identical
and homothetic preferences over a xed range of commodities, which can be represented
by Vj =
R 1
0
(z) ln ej(z)dz; with real expenditure on good z denoted by ej(z) and constant
expenditure shares (z) > 0; which are uniform across all three countries, and
R 1
0
(z)dz =
1: This assumption implies that each household spends the fraction (zi) =
R zi
0
(z)dz of
income on a subset of goods regardless of the level of income. The qualitative impact of
tari¤ changes is summarized in Table 1, with mathematics relegated to Appendix C.
(insert Table 1a/b about here)
From Table 1a, it is immediately apparent that in the present model a unilateral change
of either country 1 or 2s tari¤ on imports from country 3 ( 13 and  23) does neither a¤ect
does not show up in the trade balance of country 1 and why !3 does not show up in either of the two trade
balance equations. The former is because none of the spending e¤ects apply to country 1 goods. The latter
is because changes in the factor reward of country 3 have no bearing on spending on country 2 goods.
12As the ACF framework does not allow for asymmetric spending patterns, the comparison is only
relevant for the symmetric trade equilibrium.
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e¢ cient production of country 1 nor its relative wage ratio with country 2, !2. Consider,
for instance, the reduction in country 2s tari¤ on imports from country 3 (d 23 < 0).
This lowers the prices of those goods in country 2, but as consumers pay a tari¤ exclusive
price (due to tari¤ rebates), there is no direct demand side e¤ect on the trade balance.
At initial factor prices, country 2 loses some industries to country 3 that were in direct
competition (z6 falls). Since this competition e¤ect also reduces country 2s range of non-
traded goods, real income gains accrue for households from country 2 in terms of those
goods only, to which they respond by adding higher-indexed goods produced in country 3
to their consumption basket, that is du2 > 0. In the absence of substitution e¤ects, demand
for country 1s produce is una¤ected and no change in !2 is required. The ensuing trade
decit for country 2 requires a deterioration in country 2s terms of trade with respect to
country 3 (higher !2=!3) to restore equilibrium, implying a deterioration in country 1s
terms of trade with respect to country 3 (lower !3).
These results are in sharp contrast to the ones derived by ACF that are given in the
lower panel of Table 1a for comparison. Considering the same reduction in  23, country 3s
terms of trade with respect to country 2 and 1 improve (higher !2=!3 and lower !3). In
contrast to our model, however, country 1s terms of trade vis-à-vis country 2 have to change
(higher !2). The main reason is the presence of substitution e¤ects in their framework.
Lower prices of country 3s goods in country 2 induces households to substitute away from
the relatively more expensive domestic and country 1 goods. The bilateral trade balance
of country 3 with 2 moves into surplus and the bilateral trade balance of country 1 with
2 into decit, requiring changes in the factor terms of trade to preserve balanced trade
equilibrium.
The di¤erence in demand structure has important implications for the analysis to fol-
low. Comparing our results in Table 1a with those of ACF shows that our results are
often determined by (i) the degree of comparative advantage a country has at a particular
borderline good zk - represented by the parameters 2 > 0 and   3   2 > 0; and (ii)
the size of real income changes, which are decisively determined by the population size.
With regard to the degree of comparative advantage, consider, for example, a reduction
in country 1s tari¤ on imports from country 2, that is, d 12 < 0; ceteris paribus. At initial
relative wages, a fall in  12 reduces the price of country 2 goods in country 1, and its range
of imports from country 2 increases at the expense of (some) domestic rms (lower z3) and
of some rms from country 3 that directly compete with country 2 rms on country 1s
market (higher z5). The extent of comparative advantage at the borderline commodities
is important as it determines how many industries are lost to other countries. If, for
instance, 2 is low, country 1 has a weak comparative advantage compared to country 2 at
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z3, implying a substantial loss of industries to country 2. A low , by contrast, implies that
country 3s comparative advantage vis-à-vis country 2 is weak at z5, enabling country 2 to
take over a considerable number of country 3s export industries to country 1. Of these
competition e¤ects, the reduction in z3 increases the real income of country 1 households,
while the increase in z5 increases real income in country 2 and decreases real income in
country 3.
Conning ourselves to the symmetric trade equilibrium, all real income changes a¤ect
spending on country 3 goods only. For country 1 these e¤ects therefore imply a loss of
industries to country 2, while it increases spending on goods from country 3, du1 > 0. The
competition e¤ect explains why country 1s factor terms of trade with country 2 deteriorates
irrespective of 2 and  (lower !2); the spending e¤ect helps to explain the deterioration of
its factor terms of trade with country 3. The weaker its comparative advantage at z3; the
higher the real income gains and the more spending on country 3 goods will expand.13 For
the e¤ects on country 3 the values  and 2 take are more important. Suppose that 2 is
small, for a given positive value of   3   2. This implies large real income gains for
country 1 households, but hardly any competition e¤ects between country 2 and country
3. The real income gains become e¤ective in country 3, and to restore equilibrium, country
3s relative factor terms of trade have to improve (lower !3 and, in the absence of strong
competition e¤ects, !2=!3 goes up). Suppose now that 2 is given, and that  is small
but positive. The real income gains in country 1 are much smaller than before, so that
the e¤ects are dominated by the large competition e¤ect on the borderline commodity of
country 2 and 3. At initial factor prices, country 3s balance of trade turns into a decit and
country 3s factor terms of trade have to deteriorate to restore equilibrium (lower !2=!3).
To see the importance of the size of real income changes and thus the size of the
population on the endogenous variables, let us consider the tari¤ reduction d 31 < 0; ceteris
paribus. This reduces the price of country 1s imports in country 3 and rms from country
1 gain in competitiveness with respect to rms from country 2 so that z2 goes up. At initial
factor prices, country 1 experiences a trade surplus, while for country 2 an equivalent decit
results. Country 1s terms of trade vis-a-vis country 2 has to improve (higher !2) to restore
equilibrium. This indirectly reduces z2, but the direct e¤ect overcomes the indirect e¤ect
and z2 increases. Recall that the change in !2 has no direct e¤ect on country 3s initial trade
balance. However, it will a¤ect all other borderline goods in addition to z2: In particular,
country 1s range of domestic production falls (lower z3) and previously non-traded goods
13As shown in the appendix, the change in du1 for given relative wages is a¤ected by both the change
in z3 and z5: Assuming that country 1 imposes the same tari¤ on imports from country 2 and 3 in the
original equilibrium, that is 12 = 13; the latter e¤ect cancels.
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are now imported from country 2. This increases country 1s real income and its imports
from country 3 increases by N1a1(z3)z3(1 1= 12). On the other hand, country 2s range of
production increases at the lower end (lower z1) and households replace goods previously
imported from country 1 with domestic goods that are now non-traded. Country 2s real
income falls and so are its imports from country 3 to the extent of N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1).
Assuming that N1a1(z3)z3(1 1= 12) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21 1), country 3s trade balance turns
into a surplus. The increase of !2 also a¤ects the upper range of the borderline goods zk,
for k = 4; 5; 6. From the point of view of country 3, imports from country 2 increase (higher
z4), while exports to countries 2 and 1 decrease (higher z5 and z6). With imports increasing
on net, country 3s trade balance turns into a decit. The improvement of !2 for given !3
has an ambiguous e¤ect on country 3s trade balance and hence on the required change in
!3: For given positive , and letting N1a1(z3)z3(1 1= 12) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21 1); a small 2
implies that the real income e¤ect dominates the competition e¤ect and country 3s trade
balance turns into a surplus. As a consequence, !3 has to fall for country 3s relative wage
ratio with country 2 to improve (higher !2=!3). By contrast, for 2 positive and  small,
the real income e¤ect is negligible and the increase in imports dominate. Country 3s trade
balance turns into a decit and its terms of trade with country 1 have to deteriorate (higher
!3) relative to the higher !2 to reduce the increase in country 3s imports.14
Some of the ambiguities are resolved when considering the asymmetric trade equilib-
rium. Recall that this equilibrium conguration implies that country 1 spends its last unit
of income on goods produced in country 2 instead of country 3. Consequently, the real
income gain due to, for example, lower  12 becomes e¤ective in country 2 and country 3s
trade balance turns unambiguously into a decit, at initial factor prices (see Table 1b).
Likewise, the same fall in  31 that improves country 1s relative wage ratio with country
2, ceteris paribus, increases country 1s imports from country 2 but reduces country 2s
imports from country 3, thereby generating a trade decit for country 3. To restore equi-
librium country 3s relative wage ratio with country 2 has to deteriorate (lower !2=!3)
implying that country 1s relative wage ratio with country 3 to improve (higher !3). The
change in the relative factor price a¤ects indirectly all other borderline goods zk, as illus-
trated in Table 1b.
14Note, in case that the real income change of country 2 is larger in comparison to country 1, that
is, N1a2(z3)z3(12   1) < N2a1(z1)z1(21   1); country 3s trade balance turns into a decit, regardless
of the values for  and 2: We exclude this possibility and assume for the remainder of the paper that
N1 > N2 > N3; ensuring that country 1 is the poorest country while country 3 the richest.
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5 Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements between
Heterogeneous Countries
We now proceed with investigating the e¤ects of the formation of preferential trade agree-
ments (PTAs) on global specialization and terms of trade. Before we discuss our main
ndings, it is useful to point out that establishing the e¤ects of PTAs essentially boils
down to adding the general equilibrium e¤ects of the relevant unilateral tari¤ reductions
that were discussed in the previous section.15 The reasoning we will employ therefore con-
sists of the same two main e¤ects we have seen before. The rst e¤ect is that when tari¤s
come down, the competitiveness of a countrys industries is a¤ected, and thereby the de-
rived demand for labor. The second e¤ect is that the formation of PTAs also a¤ects the
ranges of non-traded goods, by which real income e¤ects accrue that a¤ect spending on
goods from either country 3 (as in the symmetric trade equilibrium) or from country 2 and
country 3 (as in the asymmetric trade equilibrium). Both e¤ects have consequences for the
relative wages in the three countries, leading to the general equilibrium e¤ects discussed
below.16
PTA between countries 2 and 3 (PTA23).
Consider rst the formation of a PTA between the high-income country 3 and the
middle-income country 2, a situation which would resemble the recent enlargement of the
EU to the east. This implies a reduction of the bilateral tari¤s  23 and  32, while leaving
all other tari¤s at their initial values. Consequently, at initial factor prices, the member
countries will expand their imports from each other, that is z2  z4 increases while z6 falls:bz2b 32 = 12 > 0; bz4b 32 =  1 < 0; bz6b 23 = 1 > 0;
where the hatnotation is used to express relative changes, e.g. b is dened as d= .17
These competition e¤ects are the same regardless the type of equilibrium we consider
(symmetric, asymmetric) and are the result of the change in competitiveness of country
15A detailed appendix containing all the derivatives is available in an appendix upon request from the
authors.
16Traditionally, the analysis of the formation of PTAs has been formulated in terms of trade diversion
and trade creation. For general equilibrium analyses this terminology fails to capture all aspects of dis-
criminatory trade liberalization. Nevertheless, some elements in our analysis bear resemblance with the old
concepts. The reduction in non-traded areas of a PTA between contiguous countries can be seen as trade
creation in the standard Vinerian sense. Likewise, switching the source of imports due to PTA formation
can be seen as trade diversion.
17By concentrating on marginal tari¤ changes in contrast to complete discrimination our results shed
light on the initial e¤ects of PTAs.
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2 and country 3 producers on each others markets. As before, the extent to which the
tari¤ changes a¤ect competitiveness depends on the degree of comparative advantage at
the specic borderline commodity, as indicated by  and 2. The initial competition e¤ects
inuence labor markets and adjustments in the bilateral terms of trade of countries are
required to restore equilibrium. Moreover, it leads to spending e¤ects that either reinforce
or counter these labor market developments. The general equilibrium e¤ects of PTA23 are
given in Table 2. We note that the results are typically the same for both equilibrium
settings, except for some slight but telling changes in conditions.
(insert Table 2 about here)
The e¤ects on z1; z2; z3 and !2 are unambiguous, which is related to the fact that the e¤ect
of a fall in  23 on these variables is zero. In determining the signs for the other variables
we see that  and 2 play a key role. We therefore discuss the table by considering the
e¤ects when  is small (for 2 > 0), to then verify the results if instead 2 is small (for
given  > 0).
Suppose 2 > 0 and  is small, that is unit labor requirements between countries 2 and
3 are very similar. This implies that the initial competition e¤ects are dominated by the
upward e¤ect on z4 and the downward e¤ect on z6 (the e¤ect on z2 is of course still there
and indeed nicely explains the negative impact on !2). The upward e¤ect on z4 increases
the derived demand for country 2s labor and lowers it for country 3s labor, while the
downward e¤ect on z6 does exactly the opposite. Consequently, the net competition e¤ect
on !2=!3 depends on each countrys marginal expenditure rate: if N3a2(z4)z4 < N2a2(z6)z6
the e¤ect on z6 dominates and !2=!3 increases, deteriorating country 2s factor terms of
trade vis-à-vis country 3. The real income e¤ects that accrue are positive, as both country
2 and country 3 may welcome a decline in their non-traded goods ranges. These real income
gains are spent on country 3 goods for both equilibrium settings, which increases demand
for country 3 labor, yielding additional upward pressure on country 3s relative wage.
Suppose now that the unit labor requirements between country 1 and country 2 are
ceteris paribus more equalized, that is 2 is small for given  > 0. In this case, the
competitive e¤ect on z2 dominates the initial e¤ects. As the range of goods country 1
exports to country 3 falls (lower z2), the derived demand of country 3 households for
country 2s labor increases at the expense of demand for country 1s labor. This explains
the negative signs for !2 and for !3 in the asymmetric equilibrium. As both e¤ects relate
to country 3 demand, the relative size of country 2 and country 3 does not play a role.
Rather it is the relative size of country 1 and country 2 that might matter. The decline
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in z2 lowers the non-traded goods range for country 2, but increases it for country 1. In
the symmetric trade equilibrium, both countries spend their marginal income on goods
from country 3, explaining why the general equilibrium e¤ect on !2=!3 depends on the
relative size of country 1 and country 2. The bigger (smaller) country 1 is, the bigger
(smaller) the reduction in spending on country 3 goods, yielding a negative (positive) e¤ect
on the bilateral factor terms of trade of country 3 vis-à-vis country 2, i.e. !2=!3 goes down
(up). By contrast, in the asymmetric trade equilibrium, the negative real income e¤ect
in country 1 leads to less spending on country 2 goods, whereas the positive real income
e¤ect in country 2 still accrues to country 3 goods. This explains why in the asymmetric
equilibrium conguration the relative size of country 1 and country 2 does not matter when
2 is small. Moreover, the spending e¤ects give rise to an upward pressure on the bilateral
factor terms of trade of country 3 vis-à-vis country 2, explaining why !2=!3 is positive.
PTA between countries 1 and 2 (PTA12)
Consider next the formation of a PTA between the low-income country 1 and the middle-
income country 2. This implies a reduction of the bilateral tari¤s  12 and  21, ceteris
paribus. As examples of such kind of arrangements might serve the recent establishment
of free trade areas between Turkey and Morocco and Turkey and Tunisia as well as those
between the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Moldovia and the
Kyrgyz Republic and Armenia.18 The general equilibrium e¤ects of PTA12 are presented
in Table 3 and can be explained by focusing on the initial competition and real income
e¤ects.
The initial competition e¤ects on z1, z3 and z5, while keeping relative wages constant,
are bz1b 21 =   12 < 0; bz3b 12 = 12 > 0; bz5b 12 =  1 < 0;
where we note that the e¤ect on z5 only arises in the symmetric equilibrium conguration.
The changes in competitiveness yield both countries better access to each others markets,
the extent of which is determined by the indicator of comparative advantage at both bor-
derline goods, 2. In the symmetric trade equilibrium, the improved access to each others
markets goes at the expense of the country that remains outside the agreement, increasing
z5. For this e¤ect  is the important parameter.
If  is small; the upward e¤ect on z5 dominates the e¤ects for the symmetric trade
equilibrium. It increases demand for country 2 labor and decreases that for country 3
18According to the World Bank classication, Turkey is an upper-middle-income economy, Tunisia,
Morocco, Armenia, Moldavia and Kazakhstan are all lower-middle-income economies, and the Kyrgyz
Republic is a low-income economy.
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labor. The real income e¤ects accrue because of changes in non-traded goods areas. In this
case, the non-traded goods range of country 2 decreases while that of country 3 increases.
As both countries spend their marginal income on country 3 goods, the net e¤ect will be
negligible compared to the competition e¤ect, explaining the negative general equilibrium
e¤ect on !2=!3 and the fact that it is independent on the relative size of countries.19
For small 2, the competitive e¤ect on z1 and z3 dominates the initial e¤ects. As country
2s imports from country 1 goes up (higher z1), the derived demand of country 2 households
for country 1s labor increases at the expense of demand for its own labor force. Likewise,
the increase in country 1s imports from country 2 ( larger z3   z5); increases the derived
demand of country 1 households for country 2 labor, at their own expense. This explains
the negative sign for !2 and why it depends on the relative size of country 1 with respect
to country 2, also when 2 > 0. The income e¤ects are as follows. The increase of z1
reduces the non-traded goods range for country 2, just like the decrease in z3 reduces it for
country 1. In the symmetric trade equilibrium both countries spend their marginal income
on country 3 goods, explaining the increase of the bilateral factor terms of trade of country
3 vis-à-vis country 1 (!3 down). Taking the competition e¤ects and the spending e¤ects
together, !2=!3 goes up for small 2. In the asymmetric equilibrium setting, the spending
e¤ects of country 1 accrue instead to country 2 goods. This has no e¤ect on the sign for
!3, though the magnitude of its positive e¤ect will be less than before as only the spending
e¤ect of country 2 remains. Consequently, also the sign for !2=!3 remains clear.
(insert Table 3 about here)
PTA between countries 1 and 3 (PTA13)
Consider nally the formation of a PTA between the low-income country 1 and the
high-income country 3. As an example might serve the preferential trade arrangement the
EU has with the ACP countries under the Lomé convention. This implies, ceteris paribus,
a reduction of the bilateral tari¤s  13 and  31, leading to an increase in trade between
member countries due to the increase in z2 and fall in z5 at initial factor prices:
bz2b 31 =   12 < 0; bz5b 13 = 1 > 0;
19Of course, we realize that the simple reasoning we continuously apply can never give the exact story
behind the results. In a way, this is proven by the unclear sign that arises in the asymmetric case. The
question mark appears because we can derive that when  equals zero, the general equilibrium e¤ect on
!2=!3 is zero as well. If  approaches zero, however, we are not sure from which side !2=!3 approaches
zero. The complex condition we could derive for that in fact includes relative sizes of countries.
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where the impact on z5 again only holds for the symmetric trade equilibrium. The general
equilibrium e¤ects of PTA13 are presented in Table 4. We note that the e¤ects are to a
large extent opposite to that of PTA23 and that the asymmetric trade equilibrium involves
no ambiguities. The latter is due to the fact that country 1 does export but does not
import from country 3 in the asymmetric trade equilibrium. For both types of equilibria,
the competition e¤ects imply that trade between the two member countries expands. Since
both countries are non-contiguous, this trade expansion goes completely at the expense of
country 2s exports. For small  the downward e¤ect on z5 dominates all other e¤ects (the
positive e¤ect on z2 again nicely serves to explain the positive impact on !2). Country
1s reduction of imports from country 2 reduces demand for country 2 labor and increases
demand for country 3 labor, resulting in a terms of trade improvement for country 3 with
country 2, that is !2=!3 goes up. For the real income e¤ects it is important that in this
case the non-traded goods range of country 2 increases [(z2   z1) and (z6   z5) go up] and
that of country 3 decreases. As households in both countries spend their marginal income
in country 3, the net e¤ect will be negligible compared to the competition e¤ect, explaining
the general equilibrium e¤ect on !2=!3 and the fact that it is independent of the relative
size of countries.
On the other hand, if 2 is small relative to , the competitive e¤ect on z2 dominates
the initial competition e¤ects. As it increases, the derived demand of country 3 households
for country 2 labor decreases in favor of demand for country 1 labor. This explains the
positive signs for !2 and !3 (asymmetric trade equilibrium). The increase of z2 increases the
non-traded goods range for country 2, but lowers it for country 1. In the symmetric trade
equilibrium both countries spend their marginal income on country 3 goods, explaining
why the general equilibrium e¤ect on !2=!3 depends on the relative size of country 1 and
country 2. The bigger (smaller) country 2, the bigger (smaller) the reduction in spending on
country 3 goods, yielding a negative (positive) e¤ect on the bilateral factor terms of trade
of country 3 vis-à-vis country 2, i.e. !2=!3 down (up). By contrast, in the asymmetric
trade equilibrium the income e¤ect in country 1 leads to increased spending on country 2
goods, whereas the income e¤ect in country 2 still reduces spending on country 3 goods.
This explains that in the asymmetric trade equilibrium the relative size of country 1 and
country 2 does not matter anymore when 2 is small. Moreover, the spending e¤ects give
rise to a further downward pressure on the bilateral factor terms of trade of country 3 with
respect to country 2, explaining that !2=!3 is negative.
(insert Table 4 about here)
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General insights
Having established the general equilibrium e¤ects for the alternative PTA arrangements,
a rst general insight is that the formation of a PTA a¤ects factor prices and e¢ cient pro-
duction by and large similarly for both the symmetric trade equilibrium and the asymmetric
trade equilibrium. Except for some telling di¤erences in conditions, the signs we obtain are
typically invariant to the equilibrium conguration under consideration.
Another insight that emerges, is that a PTA does not necessarily results in a deteri-
oration in the terms of trade of the nonmember country. Here the income level of the
nonmember is crucial. Leaving the specic conditions aside, it appears that whereas a poor
country is more likely to experience both of its bilateral factor terms of trade to decline, for
a rich country there is fair chance that its bilateral terms of trade improve. The medium-
rich country is somewhere in between. This result is a direct consequence of the fact that
in our framework goods are not gross substitutes. This ensures that positive real income
e¤ects that are brought about by lower prices of lower-ranked goods increase demand for
higher-ranked goods; country 3 goods in the symmetric case and also country 2 goods in
the asymmetric case.
Finally, our results indicate that the degree of comparative advantages between coun-
tries, as measured by 2 and ; is crucial. This is because our model does not impose any
restriction on 2 and : This is key to understanding the bilateral terms of trade e¤ects
between the high-income country and either the middle-income or the low-income country
(!2=!3 and !3). It has no bearing on the bilateral terms of trade of PTAs between the
low-income and middle-income country (!2).
6 Welfare e¤ects of PTAs
In the previous section we have examined the resource allocation and terms of trade e¤ects
of economic integration when countries di¤er signicantly in their level of income. One
of the outcomes has been that the formation of a PTA a¤ects factor prices and e¢ cient
production by and large similarly, regardless of whether we considered the symmetric trade
equilibrium or the asymmetric trade equilibrium. Qualitatively the extent of global income
disparities therefore does not seem to matter for the e¤ects of PTA formation. In this
section, we show that it does when considering the welfare e¤ects of PTA formation.
The welfare e¤ects of PTA formation are obtained by di¤erentiation of the budget con-
straints (16)-(18), assuming  jk =  jk0 for j; k; k0 = 1; 2; 3, for given productivity parameters
(see Appendix D for details). For the symmetric trade equilibrium this yields for country
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1a3(u1)du1 =
!3
!2
R z5
z3
a2(s)dsb!2 + R u1z5 a3(s)dsb!3 + !3!2a2(z3)z3(1   12)bz3; (22)
for country 2
a3(u2)du2 =  !3!2
h
1  R z6
z1
a2(s)ds
i b!2 + R u2z6 a3(s)dsb!3
+!3a1(z1)z1( 21   1)bz1   a3(z6)z6( 23   1)bz6; (23)
and for country 3
a3(u3)du3 =
!3
!2
Z z4
z2
a2(s)dsb!2   1  Z u3
z4
a3(s)ds
 b!3 + ( 32   1)!3
!2
a2(z4)z4bz4: (24)
For the asymmetric equilibrium, the expression for country 1 becomes, instead of (22):
a2(u1)du1 =
Z u1
z3
a2(s)dsb!2   ( 12   1)a2(z3)z3bz3; (25)
while the expressions for country 2 and country 3 remain the same. The rst term(s) on the
right hand side in (22)-(24) and (25) represent the factor terms of trade e¤ect(s) weighted
by the countrys value of imports. The second terms reect the impact on real income via
changes in the range of non-traded goods. This latter term can also be interpreted as the
change in deadweight loss caused by the change in the import volume as a result of the
change in the range of non-traded goods. Since we started from a tari¤-ridden equilibrium
there is also a price e¤ect of lower tari¤s on the tari¤ revenues, holding quantity constant.
This price e¤ect drops out since, with homogeneous population, the gains of lower prices
of imported goods is exactly matched by lower tari¤ rebates. The absence of !3 in (25) in
comparison to (22) follows from the fact that country 1 does only export but not import
goods from country 3 in the asymmetric trade equilibrium.
The welfare e¤ects are presented in Table 5. We rst consider the case where the poor
country is not part of a PTA, that is PTA23. When country 1 is too poor to import from
country 3 the welfare of its households deteriorates on account of the increase in the range
of goods produced locally (z3 increases) and on account of the deterioration of its terms of
trade with country 2 (!2 falls). As country 1s terms of trade with country 3 also tends to
deteriorate  !3 falls for low enough 2  du1 < 0 and country 1s welfare deteriorates.
This result also holds when country 1 is rich enough to import from country 3, be it under
similar conditions that were needed to resolve the ambiguity in the e¤ect on !3.
On the other hand, the poorest country is likely to gain when being a member of a
PTA. In case country 1 is so poor that it does not import from country 3, a PTA with
either country 2 or country 3 is benecial as long as 2 is su¢ ciently small. A union with
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country 3 is to the benet of country 1, and depends only on the degree of comparative
advantage, that is: du1 > 0 if 2 is su¢ ciently small. When  is small this also holds for
PTA13: The welfare e¤ect for PTA12 is then unclear, which is related to the positive e¤ect
on !3 when  is low. We note that when country 1 can a¤ord imports from country 3, the
welfare e¤ects are typically reversed or ambiguous. Apparently, it pays o¤ to be poor when
engaging in preferential trade.
What can we say about the welfare e¤ects for the other two countries? We infer from
the table that PTA23 gives the clearest results on the welfare of country 2 and country 3.
An agreement between the medium rich and the rich country is welfare improving for both
country 2 and 3 if  is small (this holds for both equilibrium settings). Being contiguous,
a low  implies that the range of non-traded goods in both countries reduces considerably
and large real income gains result, du2 > 0, du3 > 0. When 2 is low, it is important
for understanding the welfare e¤ects where country 1 households spend their marginal
income. If the real income losses in country 1 imply reduced spending on country 3 goods
(symmetric trade equilibrium), country 3 loses; if they imply reduced spending on country
2 goods (asymmetric trade equilibrium), country 2 loses. With respect to the e¤ects of the
other two PTAs the noteworthy result is that when country 1 is too poor to import from
country 3, the preferred strategy for country 3 is not to engage in a PTA with country 1, but
to encourage a PTA12. The absence of a positive spending e¤ect of country 1 consumers
on country 3 goods once again explains why this is the case. A similar reasoning holds
of course for country 2. When country 1 households are rich enough to a¤ord country 3
goods, some of these results reverse, emphasizing the importance of income di¤erences for
understanding the welfare e¤ects of PTAs.
(insert Table 5 about here)
This leads to the following general conclusions. First, being a member of a PTA is no
guarantee for welfare improvements. The only exception seems to be when a country is too
poor to a¤ord the whole range of products the world has to o¤er. Else the welfare e¤ects
of being a member or not depend on the extent to which comparative advantages di¤er,
both between the member countries and with respect to nonmember countries. Secondly,
it appears that being not a member of a PTA does not necessarily lead to welfare losses.
The odds are now against the poorer countries, however. The more one produces at the
higher end of the goods spectrum (here country 3), the more likely it is that being left
outside is not detrimental to welfare. This is due to the presence of asymmetric demand
complementarities. Whereas the outside country su¤ers as the PTA membersexpenditure
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switching goes at their expense, the ensuing real income gains of the members may compen-
sate for this. Third, it appears that not only the income di¤erences per se matter for the
welfare results of PTAs, but also the extent of these income di¤erences. While being a low
income country leads to di¤erent inferences regarding the costs and benets of preferential
trading agreements than being a middle- or high-income country, it also holds that these
results depend highly on whether or not the low-income country is partly insulated from
world trade. Consequently, income di¤erences between countries are of crucial importance
to gauge the welfare e¤ects of preferential trade liberalization.
We nally note that our deliberations on welfare also point at another interesting aspect
of our framework. In contrast to the standard literature on the formation of preferential
trade agreements, including ACF, in the present model the range of industries producing in
the world economy is not xed. Increases in u3, the highest indexed good that is consumed,
can be interpreted as an expansion of the global range of products. The real income gains
experienced by the richest households in the world provide an incentive for entrepreneurs
in the high-income country to invent new products. The present model can explain the
emergence of new industries in the world economy as well as the emergence of product life
cycles as discussed by Vernon (1966).
7 Multilateral, regional or unilateral?
In the previous section we have analyzed the welfare gains from the formation of PTAs.
However, gains from integration can also be achieved from multilateral and unilateral tari¤
reductions. This section explores how alternative forms of integration unilateral, prefer-
ential or multilateral matter for the welfare e¤ects of integration when countries di¤er in
income and produce goods with di¤erent income elasticities.20
The comparative static e¤ects of unilateral tari¤ reductions were presented in Table 1
and have been discussed in Section 4. The concomitant welfare e¤ects are given in Table
6a (symmetric trade equilibrium) and Table 6b (asymmetric trade equilibrium).
(insert Table 6a and 6b about here)
Table 6a indicates that the poorest country, country 1, is by and large worse o¤ from
unilateral tari¤ changes the more uniform are unit labor requirements in industries across
20The analysis therefore also has a bearing on the Johnson-Cooper-Massel proposition, which claims that
unilateral tari¤ reductions are most lilely to welfare dominate preferential trade arrangements. See e.g.
Pomfret (2001) for an overview of the discussion.
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country 1 and country 2 (small 2) and the larger is . In this case the deterioration
in country 1s relative wage with country 3 dominates all other e¤ects. Consequently,
households from country 1 experience signicant real income losses, inducing them to reduce
their range of consumption (du1 < 0). If country 1 is too poor to fully engage in world
trade, as in the asymmetric trade equilibrium, a unilateral tari¤ reduction is benecial
if 2 is small. Under the same conditions, country 3 is much more likely to gain from
unilateral tari¤ changes as the positive spending e¤ects abroad accrue to country 3 goods.
The exception is of course reducing  31 in the asymmetric trade equilibrium, as country 3
does not export to country 1. For country 2 the results are mixed.
The general equilibrium e¤ects of multilateral tari¤ reductions are given in Table 7a.
At initial relative wages, this yields the following impact e¤ect on competitiveness
bz1b =   12 < 0; bz2b = 0; bz3b = 12 > 0; bz4b =  1 < 0; bz5b = 0; bz6b = 1 > 0;
for ^ ij = ^ < 0 for i; j = 1; 2; 3 and i 6= j: Reducing tari¤ rates proportionally across all
nations only a¤ects the borderline commodities that delineate non-traded goods and traded
goods. Accordingly, labor demand for country 1s labor force declines because its highest-
ranked goods are lost to country 2, while at the same time it increases because country 2
loses some of its lower-ranked goods to country 1. Likewise labor demand e¤ects arise for
country 2 and 3. The e¤ect of this on the bilateral factor terms of trade of each country
is related to the strength of their respective comparative advantages at the borderline
commodities, 2 and . As all countries see their ranges of non-traded goods decline, the
initial real income e¤ects work in favor of country 3s labor (symmetric trade equilibrium)
or in favor of both country 2s and country 3s labor (asymmetric trade equilibrium). This
implies that if country 3s competitiveness is initially una¤ected, i.e. 2 is su¢ ciently
small, its bilateral factor terms of trade will improve across the board for both equilibrium
settings. The e¤ect on !2 depends on the relative size of country 1 and country 2. On
the other hand, if  is su¢ ciently small, it is country 1 that is initially shielded from the
competition e¤ects. The initial impact on z4 and z6 dominate e¤ects and the relative sizes
of country 2 and 3 become important for !2=!3. Absent initial e¤ects, the impact on
country 1s termss of trade still depends on its relative size with respect to country 2.
Table 7b gives the welfare e¤ects of multilateral tari¤ reductions. When the income
di¤erences between countries are not too signicant (symmetric trade equilibrium), the
rich country is most likely to gain from multilateral trade liberalization, while the poor
country stands a fair chance to lose. When the poor countrys income is so low that it
cannot a¤ord country 3 goods, also country 1 gains.
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(insert Table 7a and 7b about here)
Comparing the welfare results of the three di¤erent types of integration, only for country
2 and country 3 some qualitative di¤erences can be discerned. On many occasions our
analysis does not reveal a clear ranking of integration types. This is particularly true
for country 1. Cutting tari¤s unilaterally, engaging in preferential trade arrangements or
going the multilateral way, qualitatively the welfare e¤ects are the same. If country 1 is
too poor to be fully engaged in world trade, cutting tari¤s is benecial, while if it is rich
enough to also import from country 3, cutting tari¤s is bad. For country 2 and country 3
we can establish some ranking though. Country 3 would seem to prefer multilateral tari¤
reductions over unilateral tari¤ reductions, while in the symmetric trade equilibrium it
also has a weak preference for establishing PTA13 over unilaterally reducing  31. By the
same token, country 2 seems to prefer PTA23 over a unilateral cut in  23. Country 3 clearly
prefers multilateral tari¤ reductions over PTA13 if country 1 is too poor to buy its products.
This turns into a weak preference for PTA23 if country 1 is rich enough to buy country 3
produce. Country 2, by contrast, then seems to have a weak preference for establishing
PTA23 over multilaterally reducing tari¤s.
Numerical simulations will be necessary to shed further light on the relative preference
of countries for either type of integration. For now, the conclusion seems valid that rich
countries are inclined to favor the multilateral process and that for medium-rich countries it
all depends. Being in direct competition with both rich and poor countries implies that the
exact conditions prior to liberalizing trade are crucial for establishing the preferred type of
integration. Poor countries are invariant to the particular type of integration. For them it
is the extent of their poverty that matters. The poorer the country, the more globalization
has to o¤er.
Finally, from the perspective of the appearance of new industries, multilateral reduction
of tari¤s has most to o¤er in that respect. Engaging in PTA formation might also be
conducive to the growth of new industries, provided the income disparity between members
is not too large.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper examines the e¤ects of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on resource alloca-
tion and welfare when countries di¤er in their stage of economic development. Traditionally,
international economists have made the simplifying assumption of homothetic preferences
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when analyzing the formation of preferential trade agreements. The homotheticity assump-
tion implies that all goods have the same unitary income elasticities and that poor and rich
households alike consume all available goods in the same proportion. In light of a growing
trend towards regional integration agreements between with countries of substantially dif-
ferent income levels, we claim that assuming homothetic preferences is too far-fetched. We
therefore develop a three-country Ricardian trade model in which consumers rank goods
according to priority. The poorest country, country 1, has a comparative advantage in
the production of lower ranked goods, and, hence specializes in goods with lower income
elasticities in demand. The richest country, country 3, has a comparative advantage in
the production of the highest-ranked goods, and hence, specializes in goods with higher
income elasticities in demand. The medium-rich country, country 2, has a comparative
advantage in the production of the intermediate-ranked commodities. Goods at the lower
end of the spectrum are consumed by all households and when income increases households
add higher-ranked goods to their consumption basket.
We come to the following conclusions. First, a PTA does not necessarily deteriorate the
terms of trade of the country that is left outside of the agreement, though this very much
depends on the income level of the nonmember. We show that being a nonmember implies
for the poor country that its terms of trade typically deteriorate, while for a rich country the
terms of trade may still improve. Second, being left outside a PTA agreement is usually
bad for welfare, except for the rich country. This is due to the presence of asymmetric
demand complementarities. Whereas the outside country su¤ers as the PTA members
expenditure switching goes at their expense, for a rich country this might be compensated
by the way the PTA members spend their real income gains. These are normally spent on
country 3 goods only, explaining why the chances on welfare improvement for a nonmember
are higher the richer is the country. Third, being a member of a PTA is no guarantee for
welfare improvements. Only countries that are too poor to import the whole range of world
products can be assured that opening up their borders preferentially leads to welfare gains.
For the other countries it depends to a large extent on how comparative advantages di¤er
across the world.
The general conclusion is that the income level of a country greatly matters for assess-
ing the welfare e¤ects of PTAs. Being a low-income country leads to di¤erent inferences
regarding the costs and benet of preferential trading agreements than being a middle- or
high-income country. Moreover, it is not only the income di¤erences per se that matter for
the welfare results of PTAs, but also the extent of these income di¤erences. For instance,
if the poor countrys income level is so low that it is partly insulated from world trade,
our analysis shows that it will gain by joining a preferential trade agreement with a richer
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counterpart. If instead the poor countrys income level is such that it also imports the
higher-ranked goods, we show that it loses from PTA formation.
There are several ways to extend our current analysis. One could easily allow for
nondegenerate income distributions, Fj(hj). While this extension would make the trade
balance conditions directly dependent on relative factor prices, the more important issue
that arises is how to redistribute tari¤ revenues among households. As shown in Stibora and
de Vaal (2006), using a two country set-up, allowing for nondegenerate income distributions
is inconsequential for the essential allocation and terms of trade results.
Second, by considering only small changes in tari¤s, we have ruled out the possibility
of switching from an asymmetric trade equilibrium to a symmetric equilibrium (or vice
versa). Intuitively, we would expect that such regime switches will not qualitatively a¤ect
our results, but quantitatively they might. By performing numerical simulations we hope
to shed some light on this matter. Simulations are also useful to compare the welfare
outcomes of di¤erent trade regimes. In particular, it might help to unravel the specic
circumstances under which either of the integration regimes would be preferred. In the
paper we have given some consideration to the welfare implications of alternative forms of
integration (PTA, multilateral, unilateral). On most occasions this does not reveal clear
preferences by countries for a particular form of integration, though it would seem that rich
countries prefer the multilateral process. For poor countries it is not so much the particular
type of integration that is important, but rather the extent of their poverty. Globalization
has more to o¤er, the poorer they are. Simulations will also be helpful for assessing the
quantitative di¤erences between the two equilibrium congurations of our analysis.
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A Labor market equilibria
A.1 Labor market condition for country 1
Here we derive equation (11) given in the main text. Using (10), we note
L1 = N1
R1
0
h1dF1(h1)
=
R z3
0
a1(z)Q1(z)dz +
R z2
0
a1(z)Q3(z)dz +
R z1
0
a1(z)Q2(z)dz:
(A.1)
For clarity, let us expand the expenditure expressions, given in equation (7), as follows
E1(z) =
R z
0
w1a1(s)ds for z  z3
E2(z) =  21
R z
0
w1a1(s)ds for z  z1
E3(z) =  31
R z
0
w1a1(s)ds for z  z2
(A.2)
and
E1(z) = E1(z3) +  12
R z
z3
w2a2(s)ds for z3 < z  z5
E2(z) = E2(z1) +
R z
z1
w2a2(s)ds for z1 < z  z6
E3(z) = E3(z2) +  32
R z
z2
w2a2(s)ds for z2 < z  z4
(A.3)
Applying Leibnizs rule for di¤erentiation of denite integrals, we derive the following useful
relations from (A.2) and (A.3):
dE1(z) = w1a1(z)dz for z  z3
dE2(z) =  21w1a1(z)dz for z  z1
dE3(z) =  31w1a1(z)dz for z  z2
dE1(z) =  12w2a2(z)dz for z3 < z  z5
dE2(z) = w2a2(z)dz for z1 < z  z6
dE3(z) =  32w2a2(z)dz for z2 < z  z4
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Substituting these relationships into (A.1) we obtain
w1L1 =
Z z3
0
Q1(z)dE1(z) +
Z z1
0
1
 21
Q2(z)dE2(z) +
Z z2
0
1
 31
Q3(z)dE3(z)
=
Z z3
0
N1
"Z 1
E1(z) TR1
w1
dF1(h1)
#
dE1(z) +
Z z1
0
N2
21
"Z 1
E2(z) TR2
w2
dF2(h2)
#
dE2(z)
+
Z z2
0
N3
31
"Z 1
E3(z) TR3
w3
dF3(h3)
#
dE3(z)
= N1
Z 1
0
"Z minfE 11 (w1h1+TR1); z3g
0
dE1(z)
#
dF1(h1)
+N2
21
Z 1
0
"Z minfE 12 (w2h2+TR2); z1g
0
dE2(z)
#
dF2(h2)
+N3
31
Z 1
0
"Z minfE 13 (w3h3+TR3); z2g
0
dE3(z)
#
dF3(h3)
w1L1 = N1
Z 1
0
min fw1h1 + TR1; E1(z1)g dF1(h1)
+N2
21
Z 1
0
min fw2h2 + TR2; E2(z1)g dF2(h2)
+N3
31
Z 1
0
min fw3h3 + TR3; E3(z2)g dF3(h3);
where the second equality uses equation (9), the third equality applies a change in variables
as in Lederman (1966). Finally, expressing explicitly the inner integrals we obtain:
w1L1 = N1
R1
0
min fw1h1 + TR1; E1(z1)g dF1(h1)
+N2
21
R1
0
min fw2h2 + TR2; E2(z1)g dF2(h2)
+N3
31
R1
0
min fw3h3 + TR3; E3(z2)g dF3(h3):
(A.4)
In a similar way, the labor market conditions for country 2 and 3 can be derived.
A.2 Labor market conditions for countries 2 and 3 and trade
balance conditions
Similar to the derivation of the labor market condition for country 1, we obtain for country
2:
w2L2 =
N1
12
1R
0
min [w1h1 + TR1   E1(z3); E1(z5)  E1(z3)] dF1(h1)
+N2
1R
0
min [w2h2 + TR2   E2(z1); E2(z6)  E2(z1)] dF2(h2)
+N3
32
1R
0
min [w3h3 + TR3   E3(z2); E3(z4)  E3(z2)] dF3(h3);
(A.5)
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where E1(z5) E1(z3) =  12
R z5
z3
w2a2(s)ds; E2(z6) E2(z1) =
R z6
z1
w2a2(s)ds; and E3(z4) 
E3(z2) =  32
R z4
z2
w2a2(s)ds:
For country 3, we obtain
w3L3 =
N1
13
1R
0
max [w1h1 + TR1   E1(z5); 0] dF1(h1)
+N2
23
1R
0
max [w2h2 + TR2   E2(z6); 0] dF2(h2)
+N3
1R
0
max [w3h3 + T3   E3(z4); 0] dF3(h3):
(A.6)
Using WalrasLaw we can rearrange equations (A.4)-(A.6) to derive the trade balance
conditions for countries 1 and 2 as given in the main text by (12) and (13), respectively.
B Balanced Trade Conditions
This appendix sketches the derivation of (14) from (12). All other trade balance conditions
can be derived in an analogous way. We start from the assumption that, in the symmetric
equilibrium, all consumers spend their last unit of income on goods produced in country 3.
Making use of assumption 4 the following inequalities apply:
w2 + TR2 > E2(z1);
w3 + TR3 > E3(z2);
w1 + TR1   E1(z3) > E1(z5)  E1(z3);
w1 + TR1   E1(z5) > 0:
Hence the trade balance condition becomes:
N2
 21
E2(z1) +
N3
 31
E3(z2) = N1
Z z5
z3
w2a2(s)ds+
N1
 13
[w1h1 + TR1   E1(z5)] ;
and after making use of country 1s budget constraint yields (14) as given in the main text.
C E¤ects of unilateral tari¤ reductions
C.1 Symmetric trade equilibrium
The symmetric trade equilibrium is contained in the six equations for e¢ cient production
(1)-(6), the balanced trade conditions (14), (15), and the budget conditions (16)-(18).
Rewriting conditions(1)-(6) in percentage form yields
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bz1 =   12 [b!2 + b 21] ; bz4 = 1 [b!2   b!3   b 32] ;bz2 =   12 [b 31 + b!2   b 32] ; bz5 = 1 [b!2   b!3 + b 13   b 12] ;bz3 =   12 [b!2   b 12] ; bz6 = 1 [b!2   b!3 + b 23] :
(C.1)
where 2 > 0;   3  2 > 0; and where we have applied our assumption that 2(zi) = 2
and 3(zi) = 3;8i.
Total di¤erentiation of (14) and (15), making use of (1)-(6) and (16)-(18) and evaluated
at  ik =  ij for i; j; k = 1; 2; 3 and i 6= j; k yields
" b!2b!3
#
=
1
D
"

22 0

21 
11
#
26666666664
t11  t21
 t12 t22
 t13 t23
 t14 t24
 t15 t25
t16  t26
37777777775
T 26666666664
b 12b 13b 21b 23b 31b 32
37777777775
; (C.2)
where the superscript T represents the transpose of a vector. The determinant D =

11
22 > 0 since

11 = N1a1(z3)z3 +N2a1(z1)z1 +N3a1(z2)z2 > 0;

21 = 
22 + [N1a2(z3)z3 +N2a2(z1)z1 +N3a2(z2)z2] > 0;

22 = 2 [N1a2(z5)z5 +N2a2(z6)z6 +N3a2(z4)z4] > 0:
With
t11 = N1a1(z3)z3;
t13 = N2a1(z1)z1;
t15 = N3a1(z2)z2;
t12 = 0;
t14 = 0;
t16 = N3a1(z2)z2;
t21 = N1 [2a2(z5)z5 + a2(z3)z3] ;
t23 = N2a2(z1)z1;
t25 = N3a2(z2)z2;
t22 = 2N1a2(z5)z5;
t24 = 2N2a2(z6)z6;
t26 = N3 [2a2(z4)z4 + a2(z2)z2] :
It is helpful to recognize that

22   
21 =   [N1a2(z3)z3 +N2a2(z1)z1 +N3a2(z2)z2] < 0;
=  !2 [N1a1(z3)z3= 12 +N2a1(z1)z1 21 +N3a1(z2)z2] < 0;

21   
11!2 = 
22 + !2[N1a1(z3)z3( 112   1) +N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1)];
= 
22 + [N1a2(z3)z3(1   12) +N2a1(z1)z1!2( 21   1)];

21   
11!2= 12 = 
22 + !2
h
N2a1(z1)z1( 21   112 ) +N3a1(z2)z2(1  112 )
i
> 0;

21   
11!2 21 = 
22   !2[N1a1(z3)z3( 21   112 ) +N3a1(z2)z2( 21   1)];
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where we make use of (1)-(6) and the assumption that  ik =  ij for i; j; k = 1; 2; 3 and i 6= j;
k: Now, substituting the elements tij into (C.2) and (C.1) makes it possible to derive the
results shown in Table 1 of the text. The comparable results obtained by ACF are given
in the same table by the panel on the right. These results coincide with those as given in
Table 1, p. 154 of ACF.
C.2 Asymmetric trade equilibrium
The asymmetric trade equilibrium is contained in the six equations for e¢ cient production
(1)-(6), the balanced trade conditions (19) and (20), and the budget conditions (21), (17),
and (18). The percentage change in relative wages can then be deduced from the following
system:
" b!2b!3
#
=
1eD
" e
22 0e
21 e
11
#
26666664
s11  s21
 s13 s23
s14 s24
 s15 s25
s16  s26
37777775
T 26666664
b 12b 21b 23b 31b 32
37777775 ; (C.3)
with eD = e
22e
11 > 0 and
e
11 = N1a1(z3)z3 +N2a1(z1)z1 +N3a1(z2)z2 > 0;e
22 = 2 [N2a2(z6)z6 +N3a2(z4)z4] > 0;e
21 = !2N1 2(1  R z30 a1(s)ds) + a1(z3)z3
+N2 [a2(z1)z1 + 2a2(z6)z6] +N3 [a2(z2)z2 + 2a2(z4)z4] > 0:
With
s11 = N1a1(z3)z3
s13 = N2a1(z1)z1;
s15 = N3a1(z2)z2;
s12 = 0;
s14 = 0;
s16 = N3a1(z2)z2 > 0;
s21 = N1!2a1(z3)z3;
s23 = N2a2(z1)z1;
s25 = N3a2(z2)z2;
s22 = 0;
s24 = 2N2a2(z6)z6;
s26 = N3 [2a2(z4)z4 + a2(z2)z2] :
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It is helpful to recognize that
e
21 = e
22 + !2N1 2(1  R z30 a1(s)ds) + a1(z3)z3
+[N2a2(z1)z1 +N3a2(z2)z2] > 0;e
21   !2e
11 = e
22 + !2 2N1(1  R z30 a1(s)ds) +N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1) > 0;e
21    21!2e
11 = e
22 + !2 2N1(1  R z30 a1(s)ds)  (N1a1(z3)z3 +N3a1(z2)z2)( 21   1) :
Substituting the elements sij into (C.3) makes it possible to derive the results shown in
Table 1b. This also determines the signs of [!2=!3. The signs for bzi, i = 1::6, follow by
applying (C.1).This leads to the comparative statics results for unilateral tari¤ reductions
as given in Table 1b in the main text (left panel).
D Welfare expressions
In this part of the appendix we derive the welfare expressions used to derive the results
illustrated in Tables 5, 6a,b, and 7a,b. The welfare e¤ects follow from total di¤erentiation
of equations (16)-(18) for the symmetric trade equilibrium and equations (17)-(18) plus
(21) for the asymmetric trade equilibrium and making use of the assumption that each
country imposes the same tari¤ rate on its imports regardless of the country of origin,
i.e.,  jk =  jk0 for j; k; k0 = 1; 2; 3. We conne the discussion to the welfare e¤ects for
the symmetric trade equilibrium and for country 1. Those for the other countries and the
asymmetric trade equilibrium follow by applying analogous methodology. For country 1,
we calculate
a3(u1)du1 = a3(z5)z5bz5   !3a1(z3)z3bz3   !3
!2
[a2(z5)z5bz5   a2(z3)z3bz3]
+
!3
!2
Z z5
z3
a2(s)dsb!2 + Z u1
z5
a3(s)dsb!3:
When we use (1)-(6), the expression can be rewritten to
a3(u1)du1 =

1   13
 12

a3(z5)z5bz5 + (1   12) !3
!2
a2(z3)z3bz3
+
!3
!2
Z z5
z3
a2(s)dsb!2 + Z u1
z5
a3(s)dsb!3
so that when  12 =  13 it reduces to the expression as given in the main text.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1a: E¤ects of unilateral tari¤ changes, symmetric trade equilibrium
Our analysis A rise in :
 12  13  21  23  31  32
z1   0   0 +  
z2   0 + 0   +
z3 + 0 + 0 +  
z4  1=+2        4 +3= 2
z5   +      4 +3=+2
z6  1=+2     +  4 +3=+2
!2 + 0   0   +
!3 +
1=?2 + +1= 2 + +3= 2  3=?
!2=!3  1=+2        4 +3=+2
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0;
3if 2 ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
4if N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
ACF A rise in:
 12  13  21  23  31  32
z1   +   + +  
z2   + + +   +
z3 + + + + +  
z4 +          
z5   +       +
z6 +     +   +
!2 +         +
!3  +   +   
!2=!3 +         +
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Table 1b: E¤ects of unilateral tari¤ changes, asymmetric trade equilibrium
Our analysis A rise in:
 12  21  23  31  32
z1     0 +  
z2   + 0   +
z3 + + 0 +  
z4    1   +  
z6    1 + +  1=+2
!2 +   0   +
!3 + +
1= 2 +   +1=?2
!2=!3    1=?2   +  1=+2
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0;
The results obtained by ACF are taken from Table 1, p. 154 of ACF (1989). The compar-
ison with ACF is not relevant for the asymmetric case, as in their framework spending is
symmetric by denition.
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General equilibrium e¤ects of PTAs
Table 2: General equilibrium results for PTA23:
A mutual decline in tari¤s gives rise to:
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 !2 !3 !2=!3
symmetric equilibrium: +   +  4=+2  4=+3  4= 2   +4= 3  4=+3
asymmetric equilibrium: +   + +1=+2 n.a. +1= 2    1= 3 +1=+3
1if 2 ! 0;2 if  ! 0;
3if  ! 0 and N2a2(z6)z6 > N3a2(z4)z4;
4if 2 ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
Table 3: General equilibrium results for PTA12:
A mutual decline in tari¤s gives rise to:
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 !2 !3 !2=!3
symmetric equilibrium: + +4   +1= 2 + +1= 2  4  1=?2 +1= 2
asymmetric equilibrium: + +4   +1=?2 n.a. +1=?2  4  1= 3 +1=?2
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0;
3if  ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3 > N2a1(z1)z1;
4if N1a1(z3)z3 > N2a1(z1)z1;
Table 4: General equilibrium results for PTA13
A mutual decline in tari¤s gives rise to:
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 !2 !3 !2=!3
symmetric equilibrium:   +   +3=+2 +3= 2 +3=+2 +  3 +3=+2
asymmetric equilibrium:   +     n.a.   + +  
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0;
3if 2 ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
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Welfare e¤ects of PTAs
Table 5: Welfare eects of PTAs for uniform tari structures
u1 u2 u3
(2 ! 0= ! 0) (2 ! 0= ! 0) (2 ! 0= ! 0)
PTA12
Symmetric  1=?  1=+ += 
Asymmetric +=?  1=? +=+5
PTA13
Symmetric  3=?  4=  +4=+
Asymmetric +=+ +1=?  = 
PTA23
Symmetric  3= 2 +4=+  4=+
Asymmetric  =   1=+ +=+
1if 2 ! 0 and   0;
2if  ! 0 and N3a2(z4)z4 < N2a2(z6)z6;
3if 2 ! 0;   0; and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
4if 2 ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
5if  ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3 > N2a1(z1)z1;
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Welfare e¤ects of unilateral tari¤ changes
Table 6a: Welfare eects of unilateral tari reductions
A unilateral decline in the tari¤ rates gives rise to:
symmetric  12  13  21  23  31  32
u1  3   ?1=+2    4=+2 +4=?2
u2 ?
1=+2   ?1=?2 ?1=+2  6 +5=+2
u3 +
1= 2 + +1=?2 + +5=?2  5=+2
1if 2 ! 0;2 if  ! 0;3 if 2 ! 0 and   0;
4if 2 ! 0;   0 and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
5if 2 ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
6if N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
Table 6b: Welfare eects of unilateral tari reductions
A unilateral decline in the tari¤ rates gives rise to:
asymmetric  12  21  23  31  32
u1 +
1=?2 + 0 +  
u2  3=?2  3=?2 +2 +3=?2  3=+2
u3 +
1=+2 +1=?2 +  1= 2 +1=+2
1if 2 ! 0;
2if  ! 0;
3if 2 ! 0 and   0;
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Multilateral tari¤ reductions
Table 7a: General equilibrium results for multilateral tari¤ reductions
A mutual decline in tari¤s gives rise to:
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 !2 !3 !2=!3
symmetric equilibrium: + +3   + +1=+4 +1= 2  3  1=?2 +1=+4
asymmetric equilibrium: + +3   +1=+2 n.a. +1= 2  3  1=?2 +1=+4
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0;
3if N1a1(z3)z3 > N2a2(z1)z1;
4if  ! 0 and N2a2(z6)z6 > N3a2(z4)z4;
Table 7b: Welfare eects of multilateral tari reductions
A mutual decline in all tari¤ rates gives rise to:
 symmetric asymmetric
u1  3=?2 +1
u2  3=+2  3=+2
u3 +
1=+2 +1=+2
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0; 3if 2 ! 0 and   0;
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 Figure 1: Production and trade patterns 
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